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
INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

DECEMBER 18, 2024



(U) Audit of Munitions Storage in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan



~~Controlled by: DoD OIG~~

~~Controlled by: Audit~~

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~~FOUO: DoW OIG (b)(6) for Audit, DoW OIG (b)(6)~~

INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY

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Released by the DoW OIG FOIA Office under FOIA
Request DODOIG-2025-001043 on July 29, 2026.





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(U) Results in Brief

(U) Audit of Munitions Storage in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan

December 18, 2024

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD stored and secured munitions that support U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) operations in accordance with applicable safety and security policies. This report focuses on the safety and security of munitions storage at installations in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan that support USINDOPACOM operations.

(U) During the audit, recovery efforts for a May 2023 typhoon prevented the inclusion of DoD munitions storage facilities on Guam in the scope of this audit. Therefore, we will address the safety and security of munitions storage at installations on Guam in a separate report.

(U) Background

(U) Within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility, approximately 375,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel are dispersed across at least 66 DoD and host nation military bases. Due to the dispersed nature of forces across this vast region, the DoD uses joint munitions storage to support operations across the Indo-Pacific.

(U) The DoD has established explosives safety and physical security requirements for munitions storage areas (MSAs) that govern the design, construction, and use of all munitions storage structures (MSSs) to safeguard explosives materials from accidental detonation, damage, tampering, and theft.

(U) Findings

~~(CUI)~~ During our review of MSAs and MSSs from July 2023 through September 2023, ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

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~~(CUI)~~ ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

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~~(CUI)~~ ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

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(U) Recommendations

~~(CUI)~~ We recommend that the host units at Kadena Air Base; Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam; and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

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
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(U) Results in Brief

(U) Audit of Munitions Storage in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

(cu) ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

A large black rectangular redaction box covers the text of the recommendation.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The U.S. Pacific Air Forces Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection Director, responding for the 18th Wing Commander, 3rd Wing Commander, and 673d Air Base Wing Commander; and the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam Explosive Safety Officer, responding for the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam Commander, agreed with all the recommendations. Therefore, all recommendations are resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendations when we verify that management has implemented corrective actions. Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of the recommendations.

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(U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Commander, 18th Wing, Kadena Air Base	None	1.a, 1.b, 1.c	None
Commander, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam	None	2.a, 2.b	None
Commander, 3rd Wing, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson	None	3	None
Commander, 673d Air Base Wing, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson	None	4.a, 4.b	None (U)

(U) Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.





~~CUI~~

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

December 18, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: (U) Audit of Munitions Storage in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan
(Report No. DODIG-2025-055)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's audit. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) The U.S. Pacific Air Forces Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection Director and the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam Explosive Safety Officer agreed to address all the recommendations presented in the report; therefore, we consider the recommendations resolved and open. We will close the recommendations when you provide us documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations are completed. Therefore, please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendations. Send your response to either followup@dodig.mil or rfunet@dodig.smil.mil if classified SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions, please contact me at **DoW OIG (b)(6)** (DSN **DoW OIG (b)(6)**).

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

Richard B. Vasquez
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Readiness and Global Operations

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD stored and secured munitions that support U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) operations in accordance with applicable safety and security policies. During the audit, recovery efforts for a May 2023 typhoon prevented the inclusion of DoD munitions storage facilities on Guam in the scope of this audit. Therefore, this report focuses on the safety and security of munitions storage at installations in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan that support USINDOPACOM operations and we will address the safety and security of munitions storage at installations on Guam in a separate report.

(U) Background

(U) According to USINDOPACOM, its mission is to protect and defend the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests in the Asia-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and when necessary, fighting to win.

(U) Within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility, approximately 375,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel are dispersed across at least 66 DoD and host nation military bases. Due to the dispersed nature of forces across this vast region, there is an essential need for joint munitions storage to support operations across the Indo-Pacific. For example, Kadena Air Base has the main munitions storage area (MSA) on the island of Okinawa, Japan, and provides munitions storage for units from all U.S. Military Services.¹ See Appendix B for the command structure and associated units at all MSAs the audit team visited.

(U) USINDOPACOM needs timely access to a diverse and adequate inventory of munitions. The DoD defines munitions as complete devices charged with explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, or initiating composition for use in military operations. Due to the explosive nature of munitions, proper storage is critical to the safety of USINDOPACOM and host nation personnel. In addition, proper storage of munitions ensures availability when needed, and prevents hazards to the installations and locations where they are stored.

¹ (U) Each Military Service has a designated area on its installations for storing munitions in a safe and secure manner. For the purposes of this report, we will refer to areas where munitions are stored as MSAs, regardless of Military Service.

(U) Munitions Storage Areas and Munitions Storage Structures

(U) The DoD established standards and criteria to protect and store munitions in the custody of DoD Components. DoD Manual 5100.76 states that the security of munitions is of the highest importance to the DoD.² Unauthorized access to stored munitions has the potential to jeopardize the safety and security of personnel, activities, missions, and installations worldwide.

(U) DoD explosives safety standards govern the design, construction, and use of all munitions storage structures (MSSs) within the DoD. Examples of MSSs include earth-covered magazines, aboveground magazines, barricaded open storage, and flight line holding areas.³ Munitions at these facilities must be stored and secured in accordance with all applicable DoD policies.⁴ Figure 1 shows an earth-covered MSS and a barricaded open storage area.

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)



(U) Figure 1. Earth-Covered MSS (top) and Barricaded Open Storage Area (bottom) at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson Air Force MSA

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

² (U) DoD Manual 5100.76, "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives," April 17, 2012 (Incorporating Change 2, October 5, 2020).

³ (U) For the purposes of this report, we will refer to all types of munitions storage structures (earth-covered magazines, aboveground magazines, barricaded open storage, and flight line holding areas) as MSSs.

⁴ (U) For the purposes of this report, we focus on DoD-level criteria. Where Service-level criteria differs or is more restrictive than DoD criteria, we note that in the relevant findings.

(U) Munitions Storage Requirements

(U) The DoD has established standards for explosives safety and physical security for munitions storage. These manuals and instructions provide the minimum requirements to safeguard explosives materials from accidental detonation, damage, and tampering or theft. For example, DoD Instruction 6055.16 requires the Secretaries of the Military Departments to establish and maintain effective DoD Component-level explosives safety management programs for all DoD activities that involve, or have the potential to involve, DoD military munitions.⁵ In addition, DoD Instruction 4000.19 requires any use of property used by a tenant on the host's installation to be detailed in a host tenant support agreement.⁶

(U) Safety Requirements

(U) The DoD has specific safety requirements regarding MSAs and MSSs. For example, Defense Explosives Safety Regulation (DESR) 6055.09 establishes the DoD's explosives safety standards to reduce the risk of serious injury, loss of life, or damage to property from DoD munitions operations.⁷ In addition, DESR 6055.09 requires all locations where munitions are stored or planned to be stored, to have an approved site plan to minimize damage or injuries in the event of an accidental explosion. Moreover, DoD Manual 4145.26 states that explosives hazards should not occupy space between personnel and an exit.⁸

(U) Security Requirements

(U) The DoD has specific security requirements regarding MSAs and MSSs. For example, DoD Manual 5100.76 establishes requirements for protecting munitions stored at DoD facilities during peacetime conditions and applies to munitions with designated Security Risk Categories (SRC) I through IV. SRC is the classification and sensitivity of munitions based on the relative use and vulnerability of the munitions to theft and tampering. Table 1 categorizes munitions by SRC.

⁵ (U) DoD Instruction 6055.16, "Explosives Safety Management Program," July 29, 2008 (Incorporating Change 3, August 31, 2018).

⁶ (U) DoD Instruction 4000.19, "Support Agreements," December 16, 2020.

⁷ (U) Defense Explosives Safety Regulation 6055.09, Edition 1, January 13, 2019.

⁸ (U) DoD Manual 4145.26, "DoD Contractor's Safety Manual for Ammunition and Explosives," March 13, 2008 (Incorporating Change 2, August 31, 2018).

(U) Table 1. SRC I Through IV Munitions, by Type

(U) SRC	Examples of Munitions
SRC I	• Missiles and rockets in a ready-to-fire configuration • Complete explosive rounds for missiles and rockets
SRC II	• Missiles and rockets that require personnel or equipment to function • Military dynamite
SRC III	• Missiles and rockets that require complex hardware or software to function • Ammunition with explosive projectiles
SRC IV	• Explosive components of missiles and rockets • Ammunition with non-explosive projectiles

(U)

(U) Source: DoD Manual 5100.76.

(U) Munitions categorized as SRC I and II pose a higher risk in munitions utility, lethality, adaptability, and portability than munitions categorized as SRC III and IV. Therefore, munitions categorized as SRC I and II require additional security measures. For example, DoD Manual 5100.76 requires MSSs that store SRC I and II munitions to be equipped with an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), unless the storage area is continuously staffed or under constant surveillance.

(U) Roles and Responsibilities

(U) Military units conducting munitions operations are responsible for the safety and security of their MSAs.⁹ The following personnel are commonly responsible for safety and security within each Military Service.

- (U) Munitions personnel – manage their respective munitions operations and MSA including movement of munitions in and out of the MSA, accountability for munitions, and monitoring the MSA to ensure safe and secure storage practices.
- (U) Quality Assurance (QA) personnel – conduct inspections of MSSs to identify structural concerns and conditions. In addition, QA personnel submit and track the completion of work orders for maintenance and work required to ensure safe and secure storage of munitions.

⁹ (U) Munitions operations are defined as conducting facility maintenance operations, system reviews, or local audits at MSAs.

- (U) Safety personnel – conduct explosives safety assessments and track compliance with net explosive weight limits and safe storage practices.
- (U) Security personnel – provide physical security oversight through cyclical inspections, check MSAs during non-duty hours, and inspect buildings, including all access openings in MSAs.

(U) Joint Munitions Storage Agreements

(U) In some circumstances where joint storage occurs, there are munitions storage agreements in place between military units that include a lead unit and a tenant unit (tenant agreement).¹⁰ The lead military unit for an installation is responsible for oversight of physical security and explosives safety of munitions stored on the installation. Lead and tenant munitions units are responsible for the operation of their specific MSSs. Tenant munitions units either operate a separate MSA on the lead military unit's installation or are assigned MSSs within the lead military unit's MSA.


(U) Tenant munitions storage agreements typically require the tenant military unit to assume responsibility for assigned MSA or MSSs and the lead military unit at the installation is usually limited to responsibility for the overall safety and security of the MSA. This agreement may be documented informally using a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to define roles and responsibilities, or a formal Memorandum of Agreement when cost sharing is required. For specific lead and tenant units at the MSAs we reviewed, see Appendix B.

(U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Locations Reviewed

(U) Installations with MSAs are located throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Each installation may house multiple MSAs and each MSA may support several of the Military Services. See Figure 2 for an overview of MSAs supporting USINDOPACOM and those locations the audit team reviewed.

¹⁰ (U) "Joint storage" consists of base storage used by multiple stakeholders, one of which is the lead Military Service for the base, referred to as the lead military unit, and the others are tenant units. For this report, the term 'joint storage' is used to describe situations in which multiple Military Services share responsibilities for munitions storage on an installation, including a tenant unit having a separate storage area or storing within a lead unit's storage area.

(U) Figure 2. Munitions Storage Locations Reviewed by the Audit Team that Support USINDOPACOM Operations



(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) To determine whether the DoD stored and secured munitions that support USINDOPACOM operations in accordance with applicable safety and security policies, we visited a total of six MSAs at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER), Alaska; Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam (JBPHH) West Loch and Lualualei annexes, Hawaii; and Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan.

(U) We performed the following actions at JBER, JBPHH–West Loch, JBPHH–Lualualei, and Kadena Air Base.

- (U) Interviewed munitions, QA, safety, and security personnel
- (U) Conducted physical security and safety inspections of MSAs and MSSs
- (U) Conducted limited book-to-floor and floor-to-book munitions inventories

- (U) Performed a controlled no-notice test of the IDS when feasible¹¹
- (U) Analyzed site planning and safety management documentation
- (U) Reviewed work order fulfillment data to identify unresolved MSA and MSS condition concerns

~~(CU)~~ In addition, we gathered a list of munitions from each MSA.¹² The DoD OIG determined a nonstatistical sample size of the operable MSSs at each MSA for inspection based on the net explosive weight, SRC, location areas of concern, and tenant munitions storage agreements.¹³ We reviewed USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) operable MSSs. Table 2 shows the number of operable MSSs and the number of MSSs we reviewed at each location we visited.

~~(CU)~~ Table 2. Operable MSSs the DoD OIG Reviewed, by Installation and Military Service

(CU) Installation	MSA	Number of Operable MSSs	MSSs Reviewed
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson	Air Force (Lead) MSA	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	
	Joint Air Force (Lead) and Army (Tenant) MSA ¹		
	Army (Tenant) MSA		
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam	Navy (Lead) MSA		
	Army (Tenant) MSA		
Kadena Air Base	Joint Air Force (Lead) and Army (Tenant) MSA ²		
Total			

¹ (U) The Air Force does not operate MSSs within the joint MSA on JBER.

² ~~(CU)~~ Kadena Air Base's Air Force and Army joint-operated MSA consists of USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) operable MSSs. Specifically, the Air Force owns USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) operable MSSs while the Army owns USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) operable MSSs.

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

¹¹ ~~(CU)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

¹² (U) For our audit, we determined which operable MSSs to inspect based on whether MSSs are unserviceable, inactive, or designated for another purpose.

¹³ (U) In instances where MSSs were predominantly inoperable, the team conducted inspections and complete inventories of MSSs and MSAs of concern and SRC I and II storage.

(U) Finding

(U) ~~CUF~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
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~~(CUF)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUF)~~ Due to the explosive nature of munitions, proper storage is critical to the safety of DoD personnel and U.S. and host nation civilians. Improperly storing and securing munitions increases the risk of serious injury, loss of life, and damage to property. In addition, there is an increased risk that munitions could be lost, stolen, or misplaced without detection. The loss of munitions through damage, theft, or improper accountability could impact operations if needed munitions are not available or cannot be located.

~~(CUF)~~ Furthermore, not identifying and resolving deficiencies in MSAs will reduce the capacity of these storage areas and could impact USINDOPACOM's ability to have the required storage capacity for munitions necessary to protect and defend the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

(U) USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUF)~~ During our on-site reviews from July through September 2023, we found USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

(U) USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUF)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED] USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED] USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUI)~~ DoD Manual 4145.26 states that explosives hazards should not occupy space between personnel and an exit. [REDACTED] USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)


[REDACTED]. Due to occupational safety and fire risks, Air Force Manual 91-201 requires that non-explosive waste materials are stored in properly marked containers, placed outside of explosives facilities, and may not be stored or commingled with explosives waste.¹⁴ [REDACTED] USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUI)~~ DoD Manual 5100.76 requires specific packaging for munitions such as security seals and original packaging. In addition, the manual states that munitions should not be on the floor, out in the open, or in packaging that does not reinforce the integrity of the content. [REDACTED] USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]. Figure 3 shows [REDACTED] USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e).

¹⁴ (U) Air Force Manual 91-201, "Explosives Safety Standards," June 6, 2020, last modified March 10, 2023.

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)



(CUI) Figure 3. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
(U) Source: USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

USPACOM (b)
(3)(10 U.S.C.
139e)

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

¹⁶ (CUI) In case of a fire, munitions designated as a mass explosion hazard (the type stored at this MSS) require personnel to take cover vice fighting the fire.

(CUI)	Installation	Responsible Service	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
	Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson	Air Force MSA	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	
Army MSA				
Joint Air Force and Army MSA				
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam	Navy MSA			
	Army MSA			
Kadena Air Base	Joint Air Force and Army MSA			

(U) USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

(S) USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]

DESR 6055.09 states that structures containing holes, cracks, or pitting in the concrete or damage that would impact the integrity of the structure would compromise the structures' ability to withstand blast loads and protect munitions. [REDACTED] USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Figure 4 shows [REDACTED] USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED].

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)



(CUF) Figure 4. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
(U) Source USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) with DoD OIG annotation.

(CUF) USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

.¹⁷ DESR 6055.09 states that DoD Components must describe naturally occurring environmental effects that could cause harm to munitions and establish procedures for monitoring them. In addition, DESR 6055.09 states that some munitions, depending on their components, are vulnerable when exposed to water.

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

. See Table 4 for USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) and their MSA locations.

¹⁷ (U) For our review, evidence of USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUI)~~ Table 4. ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~, by MSA

(CUI)	Installation	MSA at Installation	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson		Air Force MSA	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
		Army MSA	
		Joint Air Force and Army MSA	
Kadena Air Base		Joint Air Force and Army MSA	
Total			(CUI)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

~~(CUI)~~ ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~(CUI)~~ According to DESR 6055.09, properly maintained LPSs are required for all MSAs that store munitions. DESR 6055.09 also requires these LPSs to be visually inspected at least annually. ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~(CUI)~~ ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

(U) ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~(CUI)~~ ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~(CUF)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

~~(CUF)~~ According to DESR 6055.09, the primary purpose of a structure is to protect munitions. If the doors are not secure or have significant degradation, the protection and security of the munitions are at risk. **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e). See Table 5 for **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**, by site visit.

~~(CUF)~~ Table 5. **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**, by MSA

(CUF) Installation	MSA at Installation	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson	Air Force MSA	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	
	Joint Air Force and Army MSA		
	Army MSA		
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam	Navy MSA		
	Army MSA		
Kadena Air Base	Joint Air Force and Army MSA		
Total			

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

~~(CUF)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

(U) DoD Manual 5100.76 requires perimeter fencing to adhere to the following standards.

- (U) The minimum fencing height will be 6 feet, excluding the top guard/support.
- (U) The bottom of the fence will extend 2 inches into the ground.

- (U) Surfaces be stabilized in areas where loose sand, shifting soils, or surface waters may cause erosion, and thereby assist an intruder in penetrating the area.

~~(CUI)~~ ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~(CUI)~~ ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

See Table 6 for ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~, by MSA.

~~(CUI)~~ ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~(CUI)~~ ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~(CUI)~~ Table 6. ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~, by MSA

(CUI) Installation	MSA at Installations	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson	Air Force MSA	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
	Army MSA	
	Joint Air Force and Army MSA	
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam	Army MSA	(CUI)
Kadena Air Base	Joint Air Force and Army MSA	

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)



(CUI) Figure 5. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

~~(CUI)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

~~(CUI)~~ According to DoD Manual 5100.76, clear zones must extend up to a minimum of 12 feet beyond the perimeter fence and 30 feet within the perimeter fence.

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

- ~~(CUI)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

- ~~(CUI)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

- ~~(CUI)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUI)~~ Figure 6. **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

(U) Source: Apple iMaps with DoD OIG annotation.

~~(CUF)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUF)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUF)~~ According to DoD Manual 5100.76, MSSs that store SRC I and II munitions shall be protected by an IDS unless the areas where they are located are continuously manned or under constant surveillance. In addition, DoD Manual 5100.76 requires that response forces shall respond within 15 minutes after receipt of an alarm signal. Moreover, the IDS shall have a protected independent backup source that provides a minimum of 8 hours of power. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

- ~~(CUF)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

- ~~(CUF)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

- ~~(CUF)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUF)~~ DoD Manual 5100.76 requires inner perimeter fencing for MSSs storing SRC I and II munitions when the installation does not have adequate outer perimeter fencing with access points protected by IDS integrated with surveillance cameras for the MSA. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

¹⁸ (U) USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

¹⁹ ~~(CUF)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUI)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED], as shown in Table 7.

~~(CUI)~~ Table 7. **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)** by MSA

(CUI)	Installation	MSA at Installations	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
		Air Force MSA	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
	Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson	Army MSA	
	Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam	Army MSA	
	Kadena Air Base	Joint Air Force and Army MSA	

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

~~(CUI)~~ According to DoD Manual 5100.76, sufficient exterior lighting is required to detect unauthorized activity for MSSs that store SRC I and II munitions. Additionally, DoD Manual 5100.76 requires switches for exterior lights installed in such a manner that they are only accessible to individuals with authorized access. **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**
[REDACTED]. Table 8 lists **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**
[REDACTED], by MSA.

~~(CUI)~~ Table 8. **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**,
by MSA

(CUI) Installation	MSA	MSSs Reviewed
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson	Air Force MSA	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
	Army MSA	
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam	Navy MSA	
	Army MSA	
Kadena Air Base	Joint Air Force and Army MSA	
Total		(CUI)

* ~~(CUI)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUI)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(U) USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUI)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
DoD Instruction 4000.19
requires DoD Components to establish

~~(CUI)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

~~(CUF)~~ host-tenant support agreements for any property used by a tenant on a host's installation.²⁰ Support agreement terms and conditions must be clear and understandable to the parties involved.

~~(CUF)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]

~~(CUF)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]

~~(CUF)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]

~~(CUF)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]

~~(CUF)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. DoD Instruction 4000.19 states that an MOU is to be used between any parties of two or more that do not rely on each other and does

²⁰ (U) DoD Instruction 4000.19, "Support Agreements," December 16, 2020.

21 USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[illegible]

[REDACTED]

~~CUH~~

~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) [REDACTED]

~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DoD Instruction 4000.19 requires that DoD Components establish host-tenant support agreements for any property used by a tenant on a host's installation. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) [REDACTED]

~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) [REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) [REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. We reviewed inspection processes at all the MSAs to assess whether QA and physical security inspections addressed safety and security requirements in accordance with DoD Manual 5100.76 and DESR 6055.09.

~~(U)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) [REDACTED]

(U) **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

(U)USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

(c)(1) DoD Manual 5100.76 states that DoD Components are required to develop policies that outline inspection and audit requirements for quality assurance inspections at MSAs and MSSs. **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(GUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

(U) ~~CUI~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~CUI~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

According to DoD Manual 5100.76, physical security inspections must be conducted at intervals determined by the DoD Component. Inspections of MSAs shall be conducted at intervals not to exceed 18 months and shall include, at a minimum, review of physical security measures, policy compliance, and existing deviations from policy, inventory, and accountability procedures.

~~CUI~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~CUI~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~CUI~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]

~~(CUI)~~ Due to the explosive nature of munitions, proper storage is critical to the safety of DoD personnel and U.S. and host nation civilians. ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Specifically, improperly storing and securing munitions increases the risk of severe injury, loss of life, fire, and damage to property.

USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As the DoD expands its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, the safe and secure storage of munitions is vital to timely access to a diverse and adequate inventory of munitions.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Commander, 18th Wing, Kadena Air Base:

- a. ~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

(U) 18th Wing Comments

~~(CUI)~~ The U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection (A4) Director, responding for the 18th Wing Commander, agreed with the recommendation, USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

(U) Our Response

~~(CUI)~~ Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

- b. ~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

(U) 18th Wing Comments

~~(CUI)~~ The PACAF A4 Director, responding for the 18th Wing Commander, agreed with the recommendation, USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

(U) Our Response

~~(CUI)~~ Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUI)~~ [USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)]

c. ~~(CUI)~~ [USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)]

(U) 18th Wing Comments

~~(CUI)~~ The PACAF A4 Director, responding for the 18th Wing Commander, agreed with the recommendation [USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)]

(U) Our Response

~~(CUI)~~ Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify [USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)]

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Commander, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam:

a. ~~(CUI)~~ [USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)]

(U) Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam Comments

~~(CUI)~~ The JBPHH Explosive Safety Officer, responding for the JBPHH Commander, agreed with the recommendation, [USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)]

(U) Our Response

~~(CUI)~~ Comments from the Explosive Safety Officer addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~_____~~
~~_____~~

b. ~~(CUI)~~ ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

(U) Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam Comments

(U) The JBPHH Explosive Safety Officer, responding for the JBPHH Commander, agreed with the recommendation, ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

(U) Our Response

~~(CUI)~~ Comments from the Explosive Safety Officer addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

(U) Recommendation 3

~~(CUI)~~ We recommend that the Commander, 3rd Wing, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

(U) 3rd Wing Comments

~~(CUI)~~ The PACAF A4 Director, responding for the 3rd Wing Commander, agreed with the recommendation, ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~(CUI)~~

(U) Our Response

~~(CUI)~~ Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~(CUI)~~

(U) Recommendation 4

(U) We recommend that the Commander, 673d Air Base Wing, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson:

- a. ~~(CUI)~~ ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~(CUI)~~

(U) 673d Air Base Wing Comments

~~(CUI)~~ The PACAF A4 Director, responding for the 673d Air Base Wing Commander, agreed with the recommendation, ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~(CUI)~~

(U) Our Response

~~(CUI)~~ Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~(CUI)~~

b. ~~(CUI)~~ [USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)]

(U) 673d Air Base Wing Comments

~~(CUI)~~ The PACAF A4 Director, responding for the 673d Air Base Wing Commander, agreed with the recommendation, [USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)]

(U) Our Response

~~(CUI)~~ Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once we verify [USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)]

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from May 2023 through August 2024 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) Criteria

(U) We identified the following DoD and Military Service criteria regarding the safety and security of munitions storage.

- (U) DoD Instruction 4000.19, "Support Agreements," December 16, 2020
- (U) DoD Instruction 5000.64, "Accountability and Management of DoD Equipment and Other Accountable Property," June 10, 2019
- (U) DoD Instruction 6055.16, "Explosives Safety Management Program," July 29, 2008 (Incorporating Change 3, August 31, 2018)
- (U) DoD Explosives Safety Board DESR 6055.09, "Defense Explosives Safety Regulation," Edition 1, January 13, 2019
- (U) DoD Manual 4145.26, "DoD Contractor's Safety Manual for Ammunition and Explosives," March 13, 2008 (Incorporating Change 2, August 31, 2018)
- (U) DoD Manual 5100.76, "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)," April 17, 2012 (Incorporating Change 2, October 5, 2020)
- (U) Air Force Manual 91-201, "Explosives Safety Standards, March 10, 2023

(U) Selection of MSAs and MSSs

(U) To determine whether the DoD stored and secured munitions that support USINDOPACOM operations in accordance with applicable safety and security policies, we conducted site visits at MSAs across the Indo-Pacific region. We gathered background information and conducted meetings with the DoD Explosives Safety Board and Military Service personnel to identify areas of concern. We received and reviewed the Military Services' munitions listings that support USINDOPACOM operations to determine which installations to include in our site selection based on high net explosive weight, available capacity, and number and size of MSSs on DoD installations in-theater.

(U) We selected three joint installations encompassing six MSAs. Specifically, we visited MSAs at JBER, Alaska, from July 31 to August 4, 2023; JBPHH West Loch and Lualualei annexes, Hawaii, from August 24 to August 30, 2023; and Kadena Air Base, Japan, from September 25 to September 29, 2023. In total, we visited six MSAs. We included the Army as a tenant unit because a majority of its munitions were stored on other Military Services' installations. We did not include Guam within our scope due to the May 2023 typhoon's impact on Guam, as the resulting recovery efforts prevented the inclusion of DoD munitions storage facilities on Guam in the scope of this audit.

(U) At each MSA, we determined a nonstatistical sample size of the MSSs to review. However, at JBER, the audit team determined a sample of the Army's MSSs based on SRC I and II munitions and areas of concern; therefore, the team conducted inspections and inventories on all five MSSs storing SRC I and II munitions. See Table 9 for a listing of MSSs reviewed at each MSA.

(U) Table 9. MSSs Reviewed at Each MSA, by Military Service

(CUI) Installation	MSA	Number of Operable MSSs	MSSs Reviewed
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson	Air Force (Lead) MSA	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	
	Joint Air Force (Lead) and Army (Tenant) MSA ¹		
	Army (Tenant) MSA		
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam	Navy (Lead) MSA		
	Army (Tenant) MSA		
Kadena Air Base	Joint Air Force (Lead) and Army (Tenant) MSA ²		
Total			

¹ (U) The Air Force does not operate MSSs within the joint MSA on JBER.

² (~~CUI~~) Kadena Air Base's Air Force and Army joint-operated MSA consists of ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~ operable MSSs. Specifically, the Air Force owns ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~ operable MSSs while the Army owns ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~ operable MSSs.

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Analysis for Stored Munitions

(U) For each MSA and MSS reviewed, we obtained and analyzed documentation including site plans, munitions inventories, standard operating procedures, safety deviation risk assessments, key control access logs, safety inspection results, LPS inspection and testing records, and IDS testing records.

(U) We conducted meetings with the DoD Explosives Safety Board and Military Service host and tenant personnel to discuss roles and responsibilities related to munitions storage, site planning, risk management, and oversight. We also reviewed documentation from these organizations related to the safe and secure storage of munitions.

(U) During the site visits, we interviewed staff responsible for munitions storage, security, and safety. Key personnel interviewed included the munitions accountable systems officer, QA personnel, weapons safety managers, security officials, and tenant personnel. In circumstances where joint storage occurs, we reviewed tenant munitions storage agreements. For more information on tenant joint storage agreements, please refer to Appendix B.

(U) We inspected storage conditions at the MSSs to determine whether munitions were stored in accordance with applicable safety and security policies. At the sampled MSSs, we visually observed the following areas of concern.

- (U) ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~
- (U) ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~
- (U) ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~
- (U) ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~
- (U) ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~
- (U) ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~
- (U) ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

(U) In addition, at each MSS we performed book-to-floor (existence) inventories on 20 items and floor-to-book (completeness) on 5 items. We requested and received the munitions listing onsite for the MSS inventories conducted.

(U) Internal Control Assessment and Compliance

~~(CUI)~~ We assessed internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations necessary to satisfy the audit objective. In particular, we assessed control environment, control activities, risk assessment, and monitoring. ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e). However, because our review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of this audit.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We used computer-processed data from Army, Navy, and Air Force munitions systems to identify munitions on hand at the MSSs we selected for testing. The munitions systems included the Army's Standard Army Ammunition System, the Navy's Ordnance Information System, and the Air Force's Theater Integrated Combat Munitions System. To assess the reliability of the data, we performed existence and completeness testing of munitions inventories. Our testing did not identify that there were any discrepancies in munitions inventories.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 6 years, the DoD OIG, Government Accountability Office (GAO), and Army Audit Agency issued eight reports discussing the DoD's storage of munitions. We did not identify any Naval Audit Service or Air Force Audit Agency reports related to munitions storage issued in the last 6 years.

(U) Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/>. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted Army Audit Agency reports can be accessed from .mil and gao.gov domains at <https://www.army.mil/aaa>. Naval Audit Service reports are not available over the Internet. Unrestricted Air Force Audit Agency reports can be accessed from <https://www.afaa.af.mil/> by clicking on 'Freedom of Information Act Reading Room' and then selecting 'Audit Reports.'

(U) DoD OIG

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-125, "Audit of Munitions Storage in Bahrain"
September 4, 2024

(U) The DoD OIG found that Navy officials at Naval Support Activity Bahrain stored munitions in accordance with applicable safety policies, but there is room for improvement. Specifically, Navy officials at Naval Support Activity Bahrain did not always maintain accurate inventory records or post restricted area signs at munition storage areas. In addition, Navy officials did not always store munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-126, "Audit of Munitions Storage in Jordan"
September 4, 2024

(U) The DoD OIG found that Air Force officials generally stored munitions in accordance with security and accountability policies, but there is room for improvement. Specifically, Air Force officials did not manage munitions storage in accordance with approved net explosive weight. In addition, Air Force officials did not maintain continuous awareness of the net explosive weight totals for the munitions stored in all MSSs reviewed.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-064, "Audit of Munitions Storage at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait," March 19, 2024

(U) The DoD OIG found that Army and contractor officials at Camp Arifjan did not consistently follow safety and security policies for storing munitions. Specifically, they stored munitions without a DoD Explosive Safety Board approved site plan. Army officials also did not manage munitions storage in accordance with approved net explosive weight limits and did not maintain continuous awareness of net explosive weight totals stored in MSSs. In addition, Army officials did not ensure compliance with semiannual emergency evacuation drills and annual inspections for MSSs, nor did they remove vegetation around MSSs.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-063, "Audit of Munitions Storage at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar," March 19, 2024

(U) The DoD OIG found that DoD officials at Al Udeid Air Base generally followed safety and security policies for munitions storage, but there is room for improvement. Specifically, Air Force officials did not manage munitions storage in accordance with approved net explosive weight limits, were unaware of the net explosive weight of munitions stored, and did not track the net explosive weight totals of munitions stored by two tenant organizations.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2021-090, "Audit of Munitions Storage in the U.S. European Command," June 10, 2021

(U) This report is classified. To submit a Freedom of Information Act request, please visit <https://www.dodig.mil/foia/>.

(U) GAO

(U) Report No. GAO-19-118, "Actions Needed to Enhance the Security of High-Risk Ammunition at Storage Locations," November 2018

(U) The GAO found that Military Service guidance for safeguarding SRC I munitions was not consistent with all DoD minimum requirements. The report also noted that the Military Services conducted physical security inspections of locations with SRC I ammunition and identified security deficiencies. The GAO was unable to determine whether the Military Services resolved all security deficiencies because the Military Services did not consistently document resolution.

(U) Army

(U) Report No. A-2018-0058-FMP, "Ammunition Facilities Management Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan," June 20, 2018

(U) ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

(U) Report No. A-2019-0003-FMP, "Ammunition Facilities Management, Lualualei Annex, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii," October 19, 2018

(U) ~~USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)~~

~~[REDACTED]~~

(U) Appendix B

(U) Responsible Commands on Installations Visited

(U) The Military Component commands within USINDOPACOM have a dual relationship in which the component commander will report to the combatant command and their Military Service headquarters department, such as the Department of the Army. Units that support USINDOPACOM operations report to a Service component command and an installation command. Specifically, the lead Air Force installation commanders report to the Air Force's Service component command, Pacific Air Forces; and Navy installation commanders report to Navy Installations Command and the Navy Installations Command's subordinate regional command, such as Navy Region Hawaii. We visited the following units with munitions responsibilities during the audit.

(U) JBER, Alaska

- (U) The Air Force, via the 673d Air Base Wing, is the lead Military Service for the installation.
 - (U) The 673d Air Base Wing Weapons Safety Office oversees explosives safety for the installation.
 - (U) The 673d Air Base Wing SFS is responsible for performing physical security oversight and support.
- (U) The 3rd Munitions Squadron, part of the 3rd Wing, operates two Air Force MSAs and one shared MSA with the Army.
- (U) The 402nd Army Field Support Battalion– Alaska (Army) operates two Army MSAs and one shared MSA with the Air Force as a tenant.
- (U) While at JBER, the audit team inspected one Air Force MSA, one Army MSA, and one MSA shared by both the Air Force and Army.

(U) JBPHH West Loch and Lualualei annexes, Hawaii

- (U) The Navy is the lead Military Service for JBPHH.
 - (U) The Explosives Safety Office, Commander Navy Region Hawaii oversees explosives safety for the installation.
 - (U) The JBPHH Joint Base Security Department is responsible for performing physical security oversight and support.
- (U) The Naval Munitions Command Pacific East Asia Division operates the MSA at West Loch annex.
- (U) The 402nd Army Field Support Battalion-Hawaii (Army) operates the MSA at the Lualualei annex as a tenant.

- (U) The audit team inspected both the West Loch and Lualualei annexes' MSAs while at JBPHH. The audit team also inspected several MSSs on West Loch signed out to tenants.

(U) Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa, Japan

- (U) The Air Force, via the 18th Wing, is the lead Military Service at Kadena Air Base.
 - (U) The 18th Wing Weapons Safety Office oversees explosives safety for the installation.
 - (U) The 18th SFS is responsible for performing physical security oversight and support.
- (U) Kadena Air Base has one joint MSA for the Air Force, Army, and Navy and each Military Service owns its own MSSs within the MSA and can allow tenant storage within its MSSs.
 - (U) The 18th Munitions Squadron operates the Air Force section of the MSA and conducts munitions control activities for the entire MSA.
 - (U) The 10th Support Group operates the Army section of the MSA.
 - (U) The Naval Munitions Command Pacific East Asia Division operates the Navy section of the MSA.
 - (U) The audit team observed the Air Force and Army sections of the MSA, including several MSSs signed out to tenants.

(U) Appendix C

(U) Deficiencies Identified During Site Visits

(U) Appendix C provides the deficiencies identified by the audit team during the review of MSAs and MSSs. The audit team provided lead and tenant units with these deficiencies found during site visits for corrective action during site-level outbriefs. See Table 10 for a list of deficiencies identified by the audit team during the review of MSAs and MSSs. Table 10 continues on the next page.

(U) Table 10. Deficiencies Identified by the Audit Team

(CUI) Deficiencies Identified by Audit Team	MSAs Identified
1. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
2. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
3. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
4. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
5. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
6. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

~~(CUI)~~

(U) Table 10. Deficiencies Identified by the Audit Team (cont'd)

(CUI) Deficiencies Identified by Audit Team	MSAs Identified
7. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
8. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
9. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
10. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
11. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
12. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
13. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)
14. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)	USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e) (CUI)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Management Comments

(U) U.S. Pacific Air Forces



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE PACIFIC AIR FORCES

8 October 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: PACAF/A4
25 E Street, Suite ~~(b)(6)~~
Hickam HI 96853-5470

SUBJECT: Department of the Air Force Response to DoD Office of Inspector General Draft Report, "Audit of Munitions Storage in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan" (Project No. D2023-D000RM-0094.000)

1. This is the Department of the Air Force response to the DoDIG Draft Report, "Audit of Munitions Storage in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan" (Project No. D2023-D000RM-0094.000). The PACAF/A4 concurs with the report as written and welcomes the opportunity to address the applicable recommendations.
2. The PACAF A4 in coordination with the 18th Wg/CC, 3rd Wg/CC, and 673rd ABW/CC will address issues found in this report, and develop and implement a corrective action plan outlined in the following recommendation areas as applicable:
3. **RECOMMENDATION 1:** The DODIG recommends that the Commander, 18th Wing, Kadena Air Base:

a. ~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

b. ~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

c. ~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

DAF RESPONSE: The PACAF A4 Director, responding for the 18th Wing Commander, concurs with the recommendation. In coordination with the PACAF A4, the 18th Wing Commander should:

a. ~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

(ECD: 30 JUN 2025)

b. ~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

(ECD: 30 JUN 2025)

c. ~~(CUI)~~ USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)

(ECD: 30 Jun 2025)

(U) U.S. Pacific Air Forces (cont'd)

2

4. ~~(S)~~ **RECOMMENDATION 2:** The DODIG recommends that the Commander, 3rd Wing, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

DAF RESPONSE: The PACAF A4 Director, responding for the 3rd Wing Commander, concurs with the recommendation. **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

(ECD: 30 JUN 2025)

RECOMMENDATION 3: The DODIG recommends that the Commander, 673d Air Base Wing, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson:

a. ~~(S)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

b. ~~(S)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

DAF RESPONSE: The PACAF A4 Director, responding for the 673d Air Base Wing Commander, concurs with the recommendation. In coordination with PACAF A4, the 673d Air Base Wing Commander should:

a. ~~(S)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

(ECD: 30 JUN 2025)

b. ~~(S)~~ **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

(ECD: 30 JUN 2025)

5. The PACAF A4 point of contact is **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)** or via email at **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**. Further, the wing point of contacts are:

- a. **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**
- b. **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**
- c. **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

ZUHLSDORF MICH
AELJ

MICHAEL J. ZUHLSDORF
Brigadier General, USAF
Dir/Logistics, Engineering & Force Protection

Final Report Reference

**Recommendation 2
corresponds
to DoD OIG
Recommendation 3**

**Recommendations 3.a
and 3.b correspond
to DoD OIG
Recommendations 4.a
and 4.b**

(U) Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM
850 TICONDEROGA ST STE 200
PEARL HARBOR HI 96860-5102

5090
JB00/1449
10 Oct 24

MEMORANDUM FOR DOD OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

From: Commander, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam

SUBJECT: Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam's Review and Comments of Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DODIG) Report with Recommendations

Reference: DODIG Report, Audit of Munitions Storage in Alaska, Hawaii and Japan, Project No. D2023-D000RM-0094.00

1. We received the referenced DODIG report with a request for formal comments to its recommendations. Enclosed herewith is Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam's (JBPHH's) response,

2. JBPHH comments to Recommendation 2 a: Agree. **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

[REDACTED]

a. Recommendation 2 a: We recommend that the Commander, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam: **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

[REDACTED]

3. JBPHH comments to Recommendation 2 b: Agree. **USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)**

[REDACTED]


(U) Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam (cont'd)

Subj: Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam's Review and Comments of Department of Defense
Office of the Inspector General (DODIG) Report with Recommendations


USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)



a. Recommendation 2.b: We recommend that the Commander, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam: b. USPACOM (b)(3)(10 U.S.C. 130e)



4. Please direct any questions to  Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam   at  or 


S. S. WHITE

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

- (U) DESR Defense Explosives Safety Regulation
- (U) IDS Intrusion Detection System
- (U) JBER Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson
- (U) JBPHH Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam
- (U) LPS Lightning Protection System
- (U) MOU Memorandum of Understanding
- (U) MSA Munitions Storage Area
- (U) MSS Munitions Storage Structure
- (U) PACAF Pacific Air Force
- (U) QA Quality Assurance
- (U) SFS Security Forces Squadron
- (U) SRC Security Risk Category
- (U) USINDOPACOM U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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For more information about DoD OIG reports or activities, please contact us:

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703.604.8324

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~~CUI~~



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DoD Hotline 1.800.424.9098

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